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COwARATIVE

Professor Jerome Hall, well known for his studies in criminal law and
jurisprudence, turns his attention in the present volume to the place of comparative law in the field of legal and social studies. And the reader, who has
made the study of foreign legal systems particularly his own, approaches a book
by the author, which bears an exciting title, with a sense of great expectation.
It is well known that lawyers, faced with the task of treating their own legal
system as a part of sociology, have found it difficult to marshal the manifold perspectives in terms other than normative and are concerned with statutes, their
interpretation, the role of case law, the filling of lacunae, with the growth of
these rules in the past and with the formulation of new rules for the future.
They have given little attention to the social forces which may influence the
creation, the observance and the abrogation of rules. More particularly, they
have left the task of generalization to the specialist, and Professor Hall, in
this volume, contributes to jurisprudential thought in general when he discusses the concept of positive law, the relevance of sanctions, the concept of law
for the purpose of jurisprudence, and advances a theory of positive law of
his own (p. 78) which bears a certain existentialist flavour (p. 79), culminating
in a plea for a clear distinction between the laws of the State and the social
reality of law (p. 79). These observations need not be examined here, but they
form the background of the discussion on the function and place of comparative
legal studies.
The author takes as his starting point the assertion that comparative law
is concerned with arid conceptualism, often produces results which are only
of parochial significance and not infrequently appears in the form of enumerative tabulation. As his text he relies on the statement by Gutteridge that comparative law is only a method. As his object of attack he fastens on the claim
of comparative lawyers that they are concerned with institutions and functions
which he finds unsupported by their studies (p. 69). He asserts that the question: "What is comparative law?" may perhaps best be answered by outsiders;
in so doing he could have relied on Gutteridge himself, who believed that
comparative law may mean all things to all men.' For Professor Hall, who
provides his own definition (p. 33), it is "a composite of social knowledge of
positive law, distinguished by the fact that, in its general aspect, it is intermediate between the knowledge of particular laws and legal institutions on the
one side, and the universal knowledge of them at the other extreme." The quest
is for common legal concepts and common legal institutions (pp. 30, 59), for
generalizations and trends (p. 37), significant trends and patterns of co-variation of variables (p. 40), "middle-range" social laws (pp. 40, 42, 47).
Professor Hall, as a student of jurisprudence, is, of course, at liberty to
1.

Comparative Law 26 passim (2d ed. 1949).
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define the use to which comparative law is to be put for the purpose of assisting
the science of jurisprudence, and the insight that it may yield generalizations
and trends on a limited scale, either in default or in support of universal knowledge of them, is to be welcomed, for it opens up new vistas for students of
jurisprudence who only too often have been forced to rely on the narrow basis
of their own law. Matters are different, however, when Professor Hall turns to
charge students of comparative law with a lack of direction. As the reader turns
the pages, he cannot avoid the feeling that the clock has been turned back to
the year 1900, when ideas such as that of a droit commun ligislatif as a
general pattern could be put forward as correctives of the excessive legal positivism of that period, and which themselves could claim the validity of positive
law. However, much has happened during the intervening sixty years since the
First Congress of Comparative Law met and since Roguin, Lehr and others
wrote their purely descriptive works. Professor Hall dismisses the efforts of
the last half century in a few contemptuous sentences without even mentioning
the substance of some of the works, but alone the names of their authors, and
without attempting any critical analysis of their contents. Instead he says:
"When legal comparatists speak of placing legal rules in social contexts, the
initially suggested image is . . . that of placing legal terms or ideas in social

contexts. Little has been writen by them what this means or involves, or how
it is to be employed to increase knowledge of law" (p. 86). Leaving aside the
purely methodological aspects of this statement, the reader's mind turns immediately to such works as Vinding Kruse's The Right of Property (1939, 1953),
Hedemann's Die Fortschritte des Zivilrechts im XIX. Jahrhundert (1910,
1930), Koschaker's Europa und das Riimische Recht (1947), Gorla's 11 contratto (1954), and perhaps also to Esser's Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Fortbildung des Privatrechts (1956).

Comparative lawyers not bent on jurisprudential investigations will cavil
most with Professor Hall's authoritative requirement that their work should
seek to establish limited generalizations somewhere between the knowledge of a
particular positive law and law in general. Instead, they will be attracted by
conceptual and technical differences, in order to examine how a particular
social or economic need will be satisfied in the various systems. Professor Hall's.
treatment of the trust may serve as an example. He says

".

.

. the common

concept in American and Continental law-is found among aggregates of rules of
law. The common concept connotes the similarities. It defines a class" (p. 60).
Now, the trust is unknown in continental Europe, ostensibly because divided
ownership does not exist. Further examination shows that of the various types
of trusts, the need for the charitable trust does not arise, given the existence
of the Stiftung and having regard to the development of the jondation, both independent legal entities; that the family settlement received the death blow during the French revolution, to be revived to a limited extent; 2 that the institution
2. Code Civil arts. 896 et seq., 1048 et seq. (France); Biirgerliches' Gesetzbucl
f 2100 et seq. (Germany).
,
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of heirship excludes an intermediate owner, while the need for the creation of
commercial trusts inter vivos is an unfulfilled desideratum. Upon further
examination, it appears that it is not the numerus clausus of proprietary rights
-the existence and justification of which invites an examination by itself-but
the absence of the general concept of subrogation rdelle (as Ryan has shown)
which excludes the much needed introduction of the trust in civil law countries
and -which has perverted the nature of the trust, wherever attempts have been
made to infiltrate it (as, for instance, in South Central America). Thus the aggregates of rules of law lead in different directions and the economic effects must
differ too. To a limited extent, the security of contract as illustrated by the
doctrines of frustration, clausula rebus sic stantibus and impr6vision may provide another example. This result is not, however, necessary, even where the
rules of positive law diverge, as von Mehren's study on causa and consideration3 and this reviewer's article on Protected Interests in the Law of Torts4 try
to show.
Diversity of concepts and institutions, not their convergence, stimulate the
search for their functions and effects. For this reason the various attempts to
classify legal systems in groups according to their origins, which the author
criticises (p. 94), serves the limited purpose of indicating the spheres where
divergencies are likely to be major or minor. For, while similarity promises
the ready establishment of common patterns, the modern comparative lawyer
will seek to ascertain the similarity or divergence of solutions resulting from
different institutions and techniques. Naturally, this cannot be expected from
a comparison of extremes: the Scandinavian matrimonial property regime with
its peculiar effects at the time of the death of the predeceasing spouse cannot
be placed into relationship with the regime of the Mitakshara Joint Family in
Hindu law. The Soviet Russian institution of contract arbitration, which stresses
the interest of the State in the conclusion and maintenance of contracts is on an
altogether different plane from the interference of courts in commercial contracts
in Western countries, and only the richterliche Vertragshilfe of an embattled
National-socialist Germany offers a corresponding point of departure. However, a common denominator will be found lacking: here the interest of the
State in the smooth operation of the economic plan, there the hardship suffered
by the creditor (which only exists if there is a contract, while the Russian interference ,operates also in the pre-contractual phase) provides the motive and
determines the result. At the same time, practical experience shows that within
certain groups of systems, contrary to the assertion of the author, the bodies of
law are significantly similar in all fields of what may be called "lawyers" law.
This statement does not merely express an assumption as the author believes
(p. 94). Its plausibility can be tested by reference to the studies on the
3. Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis, 72
Harv. L. Rev. 1009 (1959).
4. 1963 Camb. L. 3. 85.
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reception of Swiss law in Turkey 5 and of English law in India6 These studies
show that, except in the field of family law and succession, imported, imposed or
copied legal systems tend to develop on similar lines. Popular reaction makes
itself felt only in the sensitive areas mentioned above, and even then the force
of popular opinion, as expressed in its conduct, only serves to stifle State law.
In modern conditions, the Volksgeist does not exercise a creative force.
While comparative activities of the kind described hitherto will serve
the better comprehension of the law with which the viewer is most familiar,
they will also enable him to obtain an insight into the foreign system, the
object of the comparison, beyond the formal structure of its rules. Intellectual
curiosity and the wish for greater mutual understanding, the call for law reform,
unification and international intercourse all stimulate comparative research,
which may therefore be pure or impure in character. Incidentally, the author's
belief (p. 45) that Gutteridge criticized unification as utopian must be rejected.
Gutteridge as a founder member of the Rome Institute of Comparative Law,
where he was particularly concerned with the unification of the law of sale of
goods, and as an active participant in the Geneva Conference which produced
a uniform European law of bills of exchange and cheques, was anxious to stress
that extensive knowledge of one's own and of foreign law and its background
as a whole, rather than a Benthamist approach, provides the greatest chance
of success, given the resistance created by national susceptibilities and prejudices.
In its applied form, comparative law can and does fulfil practical functions,
when questions of characterization arise in Private International Law, because
the claim introduced into the court is presented in the light of foreign law. Examples abound; here a reference to the nature and function of consents to marry,7 to claims by the owner of a Hungarian fideicommission,8 or to bona vacantia, must suffice. Closely related is the problem of transposition, substitution
and adaptation of foreign law.' 0 Recently the efforts of the United Nation's
Economic Commission for Europe to draw up standard contracts for the sale
of commodities and of machinery has led to intensive efforts to devise agreements which are both lawful and effective according to the laws of all European countries. 1
As said before, the comparative lawyer is attracted by the diversity of concepts and institutions to search for their functions and effects in order to under5. 6 Annales de la Faculti de Droit d' Istanbul 1-251 (1956).
6. 8 Revista del Institute de derecho comparado de Barcelona 69-225 (1957).
7. See Dicey, Conflict of Laws 50, 235 (7th ed. 1958).
8. Betthyany v. Walford, 36 Ch. D. 269 (C. A. 1887).
9. See 1954 Camb. L. J. 22.
10. For these problems, see Lewald, Rigles ginfrales des conflicts de lois, 69 Recueil
des Cours 5, 127-45 (1939).

11. See Some Problems of Non-Performance and Force Majeure in International Con-

tracts of Sale, in 2 Studia Juridica Helsingiensia (1961); Benjamin, Penalties, Liquidated

Damages and Penal Clauses in Commercial Contracts:A Comparative Study of English and
Continental Law, 9 Intl & Comp. L. Q. (1960).
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stand them properly. He thus seeks to transcend the boundaries of the closed
legal system as a self-sufficient unit. Common patterns may emerge, but experience puts him on guard, for he realises the complexities of unfamiliar legal
systems, which often only practical contact can resolve, and which the lawyer
who has this practical contact is frequently the least able to discern for the
very reason of his familiarity with the working of the rules. A comparative
lawyer will, therefore, have no quarrel with Professor Hall's definition of the
subject for his own particular purposes and of his postulates, of what comparative law should offer to the student of jurisprudence, provided that the
student of jurisprudence steps down and tries his hand at it.
KuRT LIPSTEIN
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